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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003182

SIPDIS

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SUBJECT: REVISED COPY: U.S.-PAKISTAN COUNTER-TERRORISM  
BILATERALS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

[¶1.](#) (C) Summary: On August 22, a delegation led by Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Dailey met with a delegation led by Minister of the Interior Malik for a counter-terrorism bilateral, the first such dialogue since 2006. The topics of discussion included security forces training, terrorist financing, narco-terrorism, and bioterrorism. The USG and the GOP agreed to make these talks a bi-annual event, to examine how to better bring Afghanistan into the conversation for increased coordination, and to work jointly on regional public diplomacy campaigns. End summary.

[¶2.](#) (C) On August 22, the United States, led by Ambassador Dell Dailey, Coordinator of the Office for Counterterrorism, and Pakistan, led by Interior Minister Rehman Malik and representatives from the Ministry of Interior (MOI), engaged in counter-terrorism (CT) bilateral dialogues, the first such dialogue since 2006.

#### Threat Briefings

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[¶3.](#) (C) Following the opening statements, an analyst from the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) provided the U.S. threat briefing with a focus on al Qaeda and suicide bombings. The conference occurred the day after a suicide bombing killed 63 Pakistanis at a munitions factory in Wah, outside of Islamabad. MOI Brigadier (ret) Javed Iqbal Cheema provided a comprehensive analysis on the number and increasing sophistication of attacks that Pakistan has witnessed over the past few years, noting a heightened number of attacks in all four major Pakistani cities.

#### Security Forces/Police Training

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[¶4.](#) (C) Tariq Khosa, the Director General of the National Police Bureau, thanked the USG for the important training that it had provided to a large number of his police forces, including for approximately 1000 trainees through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) CT Training and approximately 4000 trainees through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), funded by the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). After discussing several of the successes of the Pakistani police forces, Khosa described current asset requirements, which included two helicopters for coverage in Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), 10,000 nine-millimeter pistols, and 25,000 bullet proof vests. Dailey reminded Khosa that, to respond, the U.S. first needed a practical,

detailed strategy for improved law enforcement, and a description of how the equipment requested would fit into that strategy.

15. (C) Ambassador Dailey also addressed the increase in foreign fighters traveling into and out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He suggested the USG provide the GOP with information and best practices on how it was confronting the foreign fighter issue in Iraq. Minister Malik agreed and noted that this would be of tremendous value in their efforts to confront foreign extremists.

16. (C) Representatives from DS/ATA also discussed the current training that they were conducting for Pakistan's security forces. DS/ATA also noted that, in response to the current shift of priorities for the GOP to Balochistan and the NWFP, they would admit a larger number of trainees from these troubled areas to assist in gaining control of the growing militancy. (Note. This briefing came a day after the graduation of the first Pakistani, all-female crisis response team (CRT) assigned to the Prime Minister and trained by DS/ATA. End Note.)

17. (C) The Embassy Border Coordinator also described USG efforts to support the Frontier Corps, as well as helping improve other law enforcement bodies within the troubled areas of the FATA and the NWFP. In looking ahead, the USG has offered to work with the GOP in developing comprehensive, long term plans for security forces working along the entire Pak/Afghan border. Additionally, the USG and GOP agreed to examine the projected equipment needs of the security forces

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(especially the elite forces within the NWFP), such as helicopters, 9mm pistols, bulletproof vests, and how those equipment upgrades support a larger strategy for improving the security situation in the border regions.

#### Terrorist Financing

18. (C) Dailey opened the terrorist finance discussion with a review of USG concerns about shortcomings with the Pakistan Anti-Money Laundering Act 2007, bulk cash courier movements, the autonomy of the Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU), and support for China's holds on Pakistan-related designations by the UN 1267 Committee. He also offered to explore seeking additional funding for training, mentoring, and capacity building for law enforcement and the FMU on preventing money laundering and terrorism finance issues. In response to a GOP request for more evidence on the 1267 concerns, Dailey presented Statements of Case on the twelve 1267 holds to Interior Secretary Kamal Shah, who welcomed the evidence and assured Dailey that the GOP would carefully review these matters and provide feedback.

19. (C) In response, the Commandant of the Special Investigation Group (SIG) of the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) presented an overview of Pakistan's legal framework for combating financial crimes, including the FIA and State Bank of Pakistan's (SBP) steps taken to prevent and address such crimes. The SIG was quick to note that Pakistan has a large informal, undocumented economy, much of which involves innocent movement of remittances, and the difficulty in preventing financial crimes is targeting those committing the crime while not penalizing those who have little access to formal banking systems. Additionally, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, which is the basis for the majority of the FIA's anti-terrorism and anti-terrorist financing efforts, does not apply in the FATA where most of the corruption seems to occur. The SIG welcomed any assistance from the USG in training enforcement officials with streamlining their efforts to prevent future financial criminality.

#### Counter-Narcotics

¶10. (C) Hasan Mahmood, the Senior Joint Secretary for the Ministry of Narcotics Control, presented the GOP stance on the narcotics-terrorism connection. Mahmood noted that the drug situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen as production and cross-border supply routes increased; there is a spillover effect of the drug trade on Pakistan, including increased transit trade. Already struggling with the realities of limited resources, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is beginning to feel a greater strain in trying to prevent the growing narco-terrorist threat. Although the ANF has experienced some great successes with the assistance of the USG in capturing and arresting narco-traffickers throughout Pakistan, Mahmood reported that the biggest challenge it faces is the lack of assistance they receive from the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) on this issue.

¶11. (C) Representatives from both INL and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) further described the need to address the counter-narcotics (CN) concern in Pakistan. INL noted that what could start off as a purely transactional relationship between narco-traffickers and insurgents/terrorists can evolve (as in Pakistan and Afghanistan) into a broader, cooperative, symbiotic relationship involving cash, weapons, and the merger of a unified ideological, operational apparatus. Using successful CN models from other countries, ONI and INL reported that the USG is currently developing interagency plans to focus on improved interdiction capability for security and law enforcement agencies in Pakistan's troubled areas. (Note. Dailey closed this session by giving assurances to the GOP that the USG would form a trilateral dialogue to better address this growing concern with the GOA. End note.)

#### Bioterrorism

¶12. (C) Although the GOP was not prepared to address the issue of bioterrorism Dailey wanted to provide the GOP with the opportunity to see how the USG was addressing this

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concern in relation to Pakistan. The Deputy Director from the Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CT), Dr. Jason Rao, briefed the delegation on the biosafety and biosecurity issues of mutual concern. Referring to biothreats as a "very real and significant threat," Rao noted that infectious disease contamination represented a significant threat to the people of Pakistan, including their security, economy and struggling public health infrastructure. To combat this concern, a robust biodefense strategy was needed, which would combine awareness, protection, disease detection, and recovery planning. The USG offered to convene a joint Pakistan/U.S. working group on bioterrorism and biosecurity to further study the issue and to find appropriate training for Pak officials in this realm. Additionally, both sides agreed to exchange information on al Qaeda efforts to procure and use WMD.

¶13. (C) Mansoor Khan, the Director of the Americas Division at the MFA, reported that the GOP would be willing to discuss biosecurity cooperation only after finalizing GOP implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Not giving a timeline for the implementation, Khan also noted that the appropriate point of contact for any future biosecurity discussions would be the MFA's Disarmament Division.

#### Closing

¶14. (C) In closing, Dailey identified 23 actions for joint follow-up and assured the MOI that this was a successful meeting, suggesting that it become a biannual event. Dailey

also offered to host the next CT bilateral dialogue in DC approximately six months from the closing of this meeting, approximately in March 2009. The two delegations also agreed that video teleconferences for the working-level experts would be useful every three months.

[¶](#)15. (U) Ambassador Dailey has cleared this cable.  
PATTERSON